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ABSTRACT
The migration of Mexican immigrants to the U.S. is one of the largest bilateral migration flows in
the world and remittances from these immigrants represent a crucial source of income for Mexican
households. As the United States tightens controls on illegal migration, this may impact both
migration durations and remittances. Tighter borders increase crossing costs, often because
migrants need to pay smugglers (coyotes). Using data from the Mexican Migration Project, we find
that higher crossing costs increase the probability of remitting, the remittance rate and the duration
of stay as undocumented workers pay off the crossing debt. If immigrants did not incur these
crossing debts then more of their earnings could be spent in the United States or by their
households in Mexico on productive activities and durations in the U.S. might be lessened at the
margin. This suggests some potential gain to both the U.S. and Mexican economies through
expanding guest worker programs and consequently reducing the hiring of coyotes.
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The flow of Mexican immigrants to the United States is one of the largest bilateral
migration flows in the world. There are an estimated 11.4 million Mexican immigrants
currently in the United States, accounting for 30% of all immigrants in the U.S (Terrazas,
2010). Mexicans also comprise 62% of the illegal immigrant population in the United
States (Hoefer, Rytina and Baker, 2011). This has been a source of concern among policy
makers and has resulted in tighter immigration laws such as the controversial law passed
by the state of Arizona requiring police to detain anyone who they “reasonably suspect”
may be an illegal immigrant (Archibold, 2010).
Each migration flow has its own particular characteristics and the Mexico-U.S.
flow is no exception. Mexico-U.S. migration is characterized by three stylized facts: short
durations, cyclicality and increasing costs. Mexican immigrants tend to stay in the United
States for only a year or two. Consistent with previous work such as Reyes (1997) and
Gitter et al (2008), 61% of the immigrants in our sample had migration durations of one
year or less and 74% two years or less. Among immigrants from Latin America,
Mexicans were found to have the lowest probability of becoming permanent residents in
the United States (Riosmena, 2010). The Mexico-U.S. migration flow is also much more
male dominated than other flows from Latin America (Cerruti and Gaudio, 2010; Donato,
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2010). The Mexico-U.S. migration flow is typically motivated by economic opportunity
and/or family networks, not a desire to escape a repressive regime (Alvarado and Massey,
2010). Hence economics drives Mexican-US migration.
The economic opportunity provided by migration to the United States follows
two cycles: the business cycle and the seasonal cycle. Agricultural workers are often
illegal and their work in the U.S. is linked to the growing season. When the growing
season ends and work becomes scarce, they typically return home to Mexico. And of
course, the business cycle matters regardless of occupation. The recent increase in U.S.
unemployment reduced the number of Mexican immigrants in the U.S. in both 2009 and
2010 as more returned home to Mexico (Hoefer et al, 2011).
Research has found that the majority of unemployed illegal immigrants (71%)
return home to Mexico within several months (Reyes, 1997). This cyclical migration was
recognized (and encouraged) by the Bracero program the United States ran from 19421964 (Orrenius, 2001). This was system of short-term, repeating guest worker visas for
Mexican immigrants. Mexican workers regularly cycled back and forth across the border
and the rate of illegal immigration from Mexico was relatively low. As expected,
undocumented workers from Mexico began to increase after the Bracero system was
eliminated. Workers who could previously enter and work legally in the United States
began to enter illegally.
Cyclical employment in the U.S. is particularly important to Mexican
immigrants, given their generally low level of education and income. The Mexico-U.S.
migration flow is not a “brain drain” migration phenomenon, the average level of
education in our sample is only six years. Rather, cyclical employment helps immigrants
achieve goals back in their households in Mexico. While only 14% of immigrants in the
sample own land in Mexico, 47% own a home (MMP, 2010). This is not surprising as
one of the purposes of working in the United States is often to help purchase a home back
in Mexico (Durand et al, 1996).
A substantial change in the economics of migration has occurred in the last 25
years. Since the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, the United States has
increased border enforcement. While the number of Mexican immigrants entering the
United States has still risen significantly over this timeframe, so have the costs of entry.
Illegal border crossings pose significant dangers from both criminals and the elements.
Eschbach et al (1999) and Cornelius (2001) discuss the dangers faced by people
attempting to cross the border. In particular, some studies have found that these policies
are leading more Mexicans to hire smugglers (called coyotes) to cross the border (Singer
and Massey, 1998). 1 In our sample we find the percentage of migrants hiring a coyote to
be 38%. However, this belies a change over time. For migrations occurring prior to 1986
the coyote hire rate was 29%, rising to 50% in the 1990s and then 62% in the 2000s. Not
surprisingly, the cost of hiring coyotes has continued to rise, even after having tripled
during the 1990s (Massey, 2007). In our sample, the average cost of hiring a coyote rose
from $325 (pre-1986) to $1,121 (1990s) to $1,674 after 2000. This is a heavy burden for
Mexican immigrants and their families to pay and it dramatically affects the economics
of cyclical migration, raising the need to remit payments back home to help pay off debt.
Remittances sent to Mexico from immigrants working in the U.S. totaled $21.5
billion in 2009 (Coronado and Canas, 2010). Even with a declining rate of remittances in
2010, they still represent one of the largest sources of foreign exchange for Mexico.
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Research has shown these remittances have significant impacts on household and
community welfare in Mexico (de la Garza and Orozco, 2002; Durand et al, 1996;
Funkhouser, 1992; Jones, 1998). Research has shown that remittances impact
productivity and agricultural investments in rural Mexico (Quinn, 2009; Taylor and
Lopez-Feldman, 2010). Remittances may even lower infant mortality rates in rural
Mexico (Hamilton et al, 2009). But, from the perspective of policy makers in the host
country (USA), it is desirable to keep funds from being remitted so that they can be saved
or spent on U.S. consumables and services. U.S. states now accept Mexican identification
(matricula) cards as identification which allows illegal immigrants to open bank accounts.
This was codified with a change in U.S. law in 2001 (Handlin, Krontoft, and Testa,
2002). Increasingly, research has focused on ways such as this to keep immigrants‟
earnings in the United States (Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak, 2006).
While trying to keep earnings within the country, U.S. policy makers have also
been increasing border controls and enforcement. Since the passage of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, the U.S. has increased the number of border
watch hours by an average of 10% per year (Mexican Migration Project, 2010). Research
has begun to focus on how these border policies are changing the way migrants cross into
the United States and how long they stay in the United States. Reyes (2001) employs a
dummy variable to test the impact of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA) and finds that IRCA increases migration duration. Using a logistic analysis with
Mexican Migration Project (MMP) data, Reyes finds that border enforcement may be
increasing migration duration for documented workers (but not in their full model of
undocumented workers). This is consistent with the results of Massey and Espinosa
(1997). Using data from a later timeframe, they find that the impact of IRCA on duration
fades within a few years after passage. 2 Using data from the 1970s (pre-MMP),
Kossoudji (1992) analyzes the impact of factors on migration durations based on whether
or not the migration ended voluntarily and found that hiring a coyote to cross leads to a
longer duration for voluntarily ended migrations.
This paper will examine issues surrounding the use of coyotes, migration
duration and remittances. Since immigrants often need to borrow from family or friends
to pay a coyote, more Mexican immigrants arriving in the U.S. do so with debts owed to
people back home. It is reasonable to hypothesize that the increased hiring and cost of
coyotes have both direct and indirect impacts on remittances. The direct impact operates
through remittance rates as a form of debt repayment. The indirect effect works through
migration duration since immigrants who hire coyotes may stay longer in the United
States in order to pay off the debt. So, immigrants who have significant debts to repay
back home will not only remit at a higher rate but will also stay longer to earn enough to
pay back the loan. These joint effects may run counter to U.S. policy makers desires for
immigrants to spend or save more while in the United States. This is especially true if
immigrants have an earnings goal in mind when undertaking migration, the “target
income” theory (Berg, 1961; Hill, 1987). Coyote use and the resulting debt is not the only
reason for remitting. Others include supplementing family income in Mexico, or
investing in businesses or land purchases back home (Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002;
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006; Mitra, 2004; Poirine, 1997; Rapoport and Docquier,
2006). Paying off debt may increase the amount of time it takes for the immigrant to
achieve these other goals.
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This paper models these effects using data from the Mexican Migration Project
and two different empirical methodologies. Distinctions are also made between
remittance rates and total remittances. The first methodology is Heckman selection which
evaluates the probability of remitting as well as the level of remittances (rate and total).
The second methodology uses the selection term generated from the Heckman to estimate
remittances (rate and total) jointly with migration duration. The analyses find evidence to
support the hypotheses that hiring a coyote makes immigrants more likely to remit and to
stay longer in the United States. Results also suggest that the more a person pays for a
coyote, the greater the remittance (both as a rate and total). These results imply that
reforming the immigration system to allow for more guest worker visas would reduce
coyote use (and costs through falling demand) and thus help to keep more immigrant
earnings in the United States and reduce migration durations.
The purpose of this section was to introduce the paper and to give the necessary
literature background for the analyses. For some wider surveys on Mexican migration
readers are directed to Durand and Massey (1992), Massey at el. (1994), Bijak (2006),
Hanson (2006) and de Haas (2007). The paper will proceed with the next section
constructing a theoretical model which incorporates the hypotheses and effects discussed
above. This is followed by discussions of the data set and variables and the empirical
methodologies. Results are then presented and the implications for the literature and
policy conclude the paper.
THEORETICAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES
This model is intended as a framework to examine the relationship between crossing
costs, migration duration and remittances. As the focus of the paper is empirical, readers
not interested in the theoretical model can skip forward to the next section without loss of
continuity. Consistent with the empirical work, the emphasis of the model is on
remittances. For the purposes of this model, the individual is assumed to already be in the
United States at time t, when the decisions regarding remittances and consumption are
being made. The migrant is assumed to earn utility both from his own consumption in the
United States in time t (Cu,t) and from his household‟s consumption back in Mexico in
time t (Cm,t). While we are calling it “consumption” in the Mexican household, the money
from remittances could be spent on many different uses. Utility is modeled as a CobbDouglas function with the weight on U.S. consumption of (1-k) and on Mexican
consumption of k. It is represented as
(1)
The migrant earns income (It) working in the United States in time t. The migrant can
spend money in the United States (Cu,t). We will assume that the immigrant can save a
portion of his income in the U.S., (St).3 These savings are income being put aside (in the
U.S.) for another use in future time periods. The immigrant can also send money to
Mexico as remittances (Rt). Part of the remittances goes to the household for
consumption (Cm,t). The price of U.S. consumption is normalized to 1 and for Mexican
consumption is Pm,t. The other part of remittances goes to repay the Mexican household
for any money borrowed to cover crossing costs. The total debt incurred from crossing
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costs is denoted D. The migrant repays a percentage (b) of this debt each time period. So,
the remittances that the migrant sends can be decomposed into money going towards the
home household‟s consumption and repayment of debt. The budget constraint in time t
for the immigrant is
(2)
Putting together the utility function and budget constraint forms the constrained
maximization Lagrangian expression:
(3)
The first order conditions (FOC) from this maximization are:
(4a)
(4b)
(4c)
Solving the FOC along with budget constraint yields the equilibrium values of Cm,t,
(5)
This equilibrium value can be differentiated with respect to k, It and D:
(6a)
(6b)
(6c)
We can express remittances in time t as
(7)
Differentiating remittances with respect to D yields
(8)
Equation 8 can be determined to be greater than zero. This means that remittances rise
with an increase in crossing debt. In the case that k=0,

. In this case, any change

in debt is entirely reflected in remittances because all remittances are used for debt
repayment. In the case that k=1 (all value on Mexican consumption),

. In this case
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all remittances are going to Mexican consumption so any increase in debt repayment
causes a countervailing fall in Mexican consumption. 4 The model also yield the
derivative

. The prediction is that remittances will increase with a rise

in income.
Remittances Over Time
The debt (D) from crossing the border is incurred once (at the beginning of the
migration). So, it is a fixed number, after the migration. The proportion (b) is paid off
each time period. So, in 1/b time periods the value of D will be equal to zero. In time
period (1/b) +1, remittances will be spent entirely on Mexican home consumption,
. Thus, we expect that as migration duration increases the
importance of debt repayment in remittances will fall. Whether or not remittances
continue to rise with income over time will depend on the value of k. While modeled as a
constant here, if k were to fall over time then remittances could decrease with migration
duration even with debt repayment ending. As discussed in the previous section, migrants
often borrow a large amount of money relative to their income and remittances for
purposes of financing border crossings. Also, the majority (74%) of Mexican migrants
stay for less than two years in the United States. The combination of a large debt with
short migration durations makes debt repayment an important factor motivating
remittances.
The model yields the following testable hypotheses:
(H1)

Remittances are predicted to rise with an increase in crossing costs.

Empirically, remittances will be modeled as both a rate and as a total. The increase in
crossing costs will be modeled as the hiring and cost of coyote.
(H2)
Remittances are predicted to rise with an increase in income.
(H3) Migration duration will have a negative impact on remittance rates. Assuming that k
is either constant or decreasing, remittance rates will fall with crossing debts eventually
being paid off.
DATA AND VARIABLES
The data are taken from the 1987-2008 Mexican Migration Project (MMP, 2010) which
is run jointly by the University of Guadalajara and Princeton University. Each year the
MMP samples at least 200 households from 3-5 different (non-repeating) Mexican
communities. The data set is cross-sectional in that different communities are surveyed
each year. Interviewers collect information about individuals who are present in the
household and individuals who are not present because of migration.
The data set is useful because it contains detailed migration histories of heads of
households. This includes information on whether coyotes were used in migrating. The
data set also contains a number of personal, household, community and national level
variables. There are three dependent variables used in our analysis: remittances per
month (the remittance rate), total remittances over the duration of the migration, and the
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migration duration (in months). These are all defined for the immigrant‟s last U.S. trip.
Remittances are defined as the real (inflation-adjusted) peso value received by a Mexican
household from the immigrant while he/she was working in the U.S.
TABLE1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR KEY VARIABLES
IN THE ANALYSIS.
Name
Mean
Std. Dev.
Minimum Maximum
Coyote hired last trip
0.38
0.49
0
1
Cost of coyote if hired (real pesos)
1545.43
4975.28
0
142710
Remittances per month (real pesos)
1406.17
4276.42
0
105051.4
Total remittance last trip (real pesos)
29636.48 116619.90 0
2974973
Duration of last trip (months)
36.53
66.92
1
570
Education (years)
5.64
4.00
0
28
Documented last trip (=1 if yes)
0.39
0.49
0
1
English skills (=4 if fluent)
1.32
1.38
0
4
Have savings account in U.S. (=1 if yes)
0.63
0.48
0
1
Access to banks in U.S. (=1 if yes)
0.84
0.37
0
1
Own land in Mexico (=1 if yes)
0.14
0.35
0
1
Own home in Mexico (=1 if yes)
0.47
0.50
0
1
Own business in Mexico (=1 if yes)
0.03
0.17
0
1
Male LF participation rate in home community
0.71
0.08
0.10
1.00
Female LF participation rate in home community
0.16
0.08
0.02
0.93
% making below minimum wage in home
community
0.48
0.20
0.04
0.96
% making over twice minimum wage in home
community
0.22
0.13
0.01
0.70
Exchange rates (pesos/$)
3.40
3.61
0.01
11.23
Note: home community refers to the immigrant's home in Mexico. Other variables used in the analysis
but not included in the table are discussed in the Data and Variables section of the paper. This includes
variables such as age, family in the U.S., previous migration experience, and border enforcement
variables.

Some of the individual level variables in the analysis include the individual‟s
years of education, whether the individual is proficient in English and two dichotomous
variables for whether the immigrant had access to banking or had a bank account in the
United States. Note that the financial sophistication of the immigrant has been a recent
focus in the remittance literature (Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak, 2006). There are also
variables for the individual‟s age, age squared, and number of previous trips to the United
States. The number of previous U.S. trips is the number of previous trips not counting the
migration used in the duration analysis. The documentation variable is equal to one if the
immigrant‟s migration is legal and zero otherwise. There are three variables for family
members in the United States (siblings, mother and father). As noted in the tables, some
of the individual level variable results are not shown for reasons of brevity but full results
are available on request.
There are three dichotomous variables to capture whether the immigrant‟s
household owns a business, land or house in Mexico as these have been found to impact
remittances (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006). There are four community level
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independent variables used including the male and female labor force participation rates,
the poverty level proxied by the percentage of the labor force earning less than minimum
wage, and the percentage of the labor force earning twice the minimum wage.
There are several national level variables. The peso/dollar exchange rate is
included as a control for currency fluctuations. There is a dummy variable equal to one if
the last migration occurred after 1986, to account for the Immigration Reform and
Control Act.5 Also included are the Mexican and U.S. unemployment rates (as business
cycles impact migration durations). 6 Finally, there are two border enforcement variables,
the number of line watch hours by the INS (later Homeland Security) at the time of
migration and the number of deportations.
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
A joint estimation model with Heckman selection is used to test hypotheses surrounding
the impact of crossing debt, income and migration duration on the rate of remittances and
total remittances. Migration duration, remittance rates and total remittances were treated
as endogenous in the system, each a function of a vector of control variables. Because
many of these exogenous variables were the same in each equation, it was reasoned that
error terms across the equations were probably correlated, thus requiring a 3SLS
estimation for efficiency. The second stage Heckman results (for remittance rates and
total remittances) are included in the Appendix. As a 3SLS is required in this case, the
body of the paper uses the 3SLS results. However, the 3SLS still requires the selection
correction term from the Heckman‟s first stage (probit) equation.
The use of Heckman selection was important because the remittance variable is
a classic example of a censored variable. Some migrants may choose not to remit because
the size of their remittances are very small relative to the transactions costs incurred (or
for other reasons). The dependent variable in the remittance equation is thus observed
only if the probability of remitting is greater than zero. The probability of remitting is
captured in the Heckman selection equation which contains at least some variables which
influence the probability of remitting rather than the actual observed remittances. If
selection hazard is present, it can be shown that the error terms in the selection equation
and the actual regression equation are correlated. If they are not correlated standard
regression techniques can be used. Hence a test of whether Heckman selection is
appropriate is a Wald test for testing the null that the correlation coefficient is zero (the
test statistic is distributed χ2).
From the Heckman estimation procedure we can obtain a variable which
corrects for the selection hazard called a nonselection hazard (nshazard) variable
(Heckman (1979)7. This variable can be added as a regressor in the remittance equations
in the 3SLS system. Hence our estimation approach is in two-stages. Stage one is
estimating the Heckman probit (selection) equation and retrieving the nshazard variable.
Stage two is estimating the two-equation system using 3sls with the nshazard variable
include in the regressor list.
We view the three equations below, estimated in the two stages, as jointly telling
a story about remitting behavior. Equation 9 is the probit (selection) that generates the
selectivity correction term then included as a control in Equations 10a, 10b, 11a and 11b.
Equations 10a and 10b are jointly estimated using 3SLS.
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(9)
(10a)
(10b)
Where z, x and y are the vectors of exogenous control variables in Equations 9, 10a and
10b, 8respectively. The Heckman nonselection hazard variable is represented as nshazard
and the error terms as The dependent variables in Equations 9-10b are the probability
of remitting migration duration and the remittance rate, respectively. The 3SLS is also
run with total remittances as the dependent variable, rather than the remittance rate (see
11b below).
(11b)
RESULTS
The empirical results are consistent with the paper's hypotheses regarding the importance
of coyote usage on remittances. The results of the probit analysis on the likelihood to
remit are in Table 2. The Wald tests for the appropriateness of Heckman selection all
pass, i.e. the null hypothesis that is rejected in all instances. The joint estimation
results of migration duration and remittance rates (while controlling for selection hazard
from the probit) are in Table 3. The results from the similarly structured joint estimation
with total remittances (rather than rates) are in Table 4.
The probit analysis in the selection equation (Equation 9) yields interesting
results. The probit finds that hiring a coyote increases the likelihood of being a remitter.
If the migrant borrows crossing costs from family or others back home, the migrant has
debt obligations to be paid back and is therefore more likely to remit. Examination of the
impact of coyote costs on the actual remittance flow is, however, complex. Higher coyote
costs have both direct and indirect impacts. Coyote costs are positive and significant in
terms of migration duration. When controlling for duration, coyote costs still have a
positive and significant effect on the remittance rate. This suggests that higher crossing
costs result in higher debt which raises both the remittance rate and migration duration.
Together these result in a higher total remittance flow.
Immigrants, of course, take on debt back home for reasons other than border
crossing (e.g .buying land, business investments, household consumption). Regardless of
the source, migration duration should have a negative impact on the remittance rate,
since the longer an individual has been working in the U.S. and sending money back to
Mexico the more likely debt has been paid off or target goals for the household met.
Also, the longer an immigrant is in the United States the greater are their expenses in the
U.S. The vast majority of Mexican immigrant durations in the sample (74%) are less than
two years and 85% are less than five years. These results hold for the entire sample (as
presented in this paper) and also for the subsample of migrations lasting less than five
years (results available on request).
The probability that a migrant will remit is positively related to whether the
migrant has a bank account in the US, is already saving and speaks English. These are
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proxies for the migrant‟s level of financial sophistication. The greater a migrant‟s
familiarity and ease with financial institutions (banks, Western Union, etc), the greater
likelihood of sending money back home (Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak, 2006; Quinn,
2005).
Our proxies for income (education, documentation, English skills) have
interesting results. We find that education (our income proxy) has a negative impact on
duration and that duration has a negative effect on the rate of remittances. Therefore,
increases in income (cet.par.) should cause shorter durations and shorter durations in turn
cause higher remittance rates. Total remittances will rise if the higher remit rate exceeds
the shorter duration. The other two income proxies (documentation and English skills)
have significantly positive impacts on duration. Here total remittances will rise if the
longer durations outweigh the lower remittance rate. Note that education and
documentation are negatively related to the probability of being a remitter, which is
logical as these factors result in lower crossing debt and is consistent with the literature
(Amuedo-Dorantes, Bansak and Pozo, 2005; Fairchild and Simpson, 2008). 9 With
documentation, the immigrant has no need to hire expensive coyote services. Higher
educated immigrants are also less likely to hire a coyote for crossing (Singer and Massey,
1998). There did not appear to be a strong income effect for either remittance rates or
total remittances as education was insignificant in each case. English skills was positively
related to remittance rates but documentation negatively related to total remittances.
Having land back in Mexico is positively related to all measures of remittances.
Two of the four home community variables are significant. Higher earnings in the home
community are negatively related to both remittance rates and total remittances while the
male labor force participation rate is positively related to both. Immigrants in the postIRCA period appear to remit at higher rates but with lower totals per trip. Devalued pesos
result in higher remittance rates, totals and likelihood of remitting. This is consistent with
immigrants‟ U.S. earnings (and therefore remittances) having more value during these
time periods.
As discussed above, migration duration is negatively related to remittance rates.
In determining the factors that impact migration duration, several variables were found to
be significant. Increased enforcement measures (IRCA, border patrol, deportations) had a
significant negative effect on migration duration. Migration duration increased with
English skills and documentation. Also as predicted, higher U.S. unemployment rates
were negatively related to duration. Mexican unemployment rates were positively related
to migration duration, as expected, but were insignificant. Education was found to be
negative and significant with regards to migration duration. This is not unexpected since
the premium to education is likely higher in Mexico than in the Unites States. 10
CONCLUSIONS
The paper's results provide evidence that the usage and cost of coyotes cannot be ignored
in analyzing remittances. Current U.S. immigration policies and enforcement result in
large numbers of illegal immigrants, many of whom resort to hiring coyote smugglers to
cross the U.S. border. The debts incurred through this transaction increase both
immigrant time in the United States and remittances sent back to Mexico. This represents
a sub-optimal outcome for all involved (except the smugglers). If immigrants did not
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incur these crossing debts, more of their earnings could be spent or saved in the United
States or spent by their households in Mexico on productive activities.
This is especially important for the majority of Mexican immigrants who are
short-term, cyclical immigrants. For this group of Mexican immigrants, a large scale
increase of the guest worker program (similar to the previous Bracero program) would
dramatically reduce the amount of coyote usage (and its costs for those who still use it).
This would result in a lower remittance flow and thus more money staying in the U.S.
economy and/or increased remittances available for development in Mexican
communities. Reinforcing the cyclical nature of this migration flow would have other
benefits for the U.S. economy via the labor market. Expanding the guest worker program
would allow Mexican workers to undertake less expensive migrations so more Mexicans
will be able to return home during the off-season. This would reduce the number of
unemployed Mexican immigrants in the United States. Reducing the number of
unemployed Mexican immigrants would help to reduce government deficits, labor market
pressures and social problems.
Beyond the impact on duration, there are direct benefits to the United States
from reducing demand for coyote services by Mexican immigrants. Coyotes represent a
breach in American border security. Drug gangs have been increasingly involved in
human smuggling (Meyer, 2009). Gangs such as the Zetas profit from human smuggling
through coyote fees, kidnapping and ransoming would-be migrants and by using migrants
as drug mules. The violence and criminal activities of these gangs have reached the point
where the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has become heavily involved (Carroll,
2011). The Department of Homeland Security is increasingly concerned about the
possibility of terrorists crossing the U.S. border through the use of coyotes (Padgett,
2003). Allowing for more legal migration through an expanded guest worker visa system
such as the previously implemented Bracero program would reduce the profitability of
these criminal enterprises.
In addition to policy matters, the paper also has implications for the literature.
The empirical results suggest that coyote use affects the migrant's behavior in a complex
manner and should be modeled as such. In particular, it is important to control for the
impact of coyotes on migration duration and remittance selection, not just on remittances
themselves. This enables researchers to capture both the direct and indirect impacts of
coyotes on remittances. This paper helps to bring together the work being done on
coyotes and migration duration with the literature on remittances.
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TABLE 2. DECISION TO REMIT: SELECTION PROBIT (ProbRemit)
Coy ote Hired

0.17
(.06)***

Coy ote Cost

7.75
(7.66)

Education

-0.03
(.006)***

Documentation

-0.16
(.05)***

English skills

0.02
(.02)

Saved M oney in U.S.

0.20
(.04)***

U.S. Bank Account

0.33
(.06)***

Land in M exico

0.13
(.06)**

House in M exico

0.19
(.05)***

Business in M exico

-0.03
(.12)

Exchange Rate

0.09
(.01)***

Post-IRCA

-0.13
(.07)*

Number of Observations
Prob>Chi-Squared
Notes: Coefficients with standard errors in p arentheses.
*,** and *** denotes significant at 10, 5 and 1% level.

4500
0.00
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TABLE 3. 3SLS ANALYSIS. MIGRATION DURATION
AND REMIT RATE
M igration
Coy ote Hired

Coy ote Cost

Education

Documentation

English skills

M igration Duration

Remittance

Duration

Rate

9.33

127.80

(1.93)***

(234.08)

0.005

0.30

(.001)***

(.14)**

-0.81

14.74

(.20)***

(27.25)

20.59

-143.93

(1.87)***

(203.61)

11.29

228.30

(.55)***

(80.62)***

-

-11.65
(5.48)**

Land in M exico

-

867.20
(203.06)***

House in M exico

-

55.58
(167.20)

Business in M exico

-

-250.76
(381.86)

Post-IRCA

-22.45

-760.75

(3.27)***

(238.83)***

LF Particip ation Rate - M ale

-

2307.05

LF Particip ation Rate - Female

-

1168.42

% Earning Below M inimum Wage

-

(1407)*

(1191.24)
-549.38
(5923.08)
% Earning Twice M inimum Wage

-

-2659.18
(1034.68)***

Border Line Watch Hours

-2.62

-

(.57)***
# of Dep ortations

-8.61

-

(4.14)**
U.S. Unemp loy ment Rate

-225.29

-

(138.58)*
M exican Unemp loy ment Rate

122.16

-

(98.37)
Exchange Rate

-

537.18
(49.52)***

Nshazard variable

714.07
(1108.63)

Number of Observations

4500

Prob > Chi-Squared
0.00
Notes: duration equation includes age, age squared, p revious trip s, U.S. and M exican
unemp loy ment and line watch hours in y ears two and three, lagged line watch hours,
family in U.S. and agricultural worker dummy . Coefficients are listed with standard
errors in p arentheses. *,** and *** denotes significant at 10, 5 and 1% level.

4500
0.00
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TABLE 4. 3SLS ANALYSIS. MIGRATION DURATION AND
TOTAL REMITTANCES

Coyote Hired

Coyote Cost

Education

Documentation

English skills

M igration Duration

M igration

Total

Duration

Remittances

9.36

-7379.17

(1.93)***

(6666.32)

0.004

10.62

(.001)***

(4.11)***

-0.81

1033.83

(.20)***

(771.33)

20.67

-14336.17

(1.87)***

(5771.00)**

11.35

-1133.36

(.55)***

(2277.32)

-

589.14
(155.76)**

Land in M exico

-

17120.52
(5769.26)***

House in M exico

-

-5386.58
(4805.74)

Business in M exico

-

7269.29
(10844.18)

Post-IRCA

LF Participation Rate - M ale

-23.51

15158.15

(3.28)***

(6498.72)**

-

91462.65
(39986.32)**

LF Participation Rate - Female

-

10537.00
(33855.02)

% Earning Below M inimum Wage

-

-12898.07
(16823.60)

% Earning Twice M inimum Wage

-

-61434.69
(29412.35)**

Border Line Watch Hours

-2.85

-

(.57)***
# of Deportations

-9.66

-

(4.15)**
U.S. Unemployment Rate

-229.53

-

(139.07)*
M exican Unemployment Rate

106.04

-

(98.72)
Exchange Rate

-

8794.78
(1307.33)***

Nshazard

-5376.03
(31813)

Number of Observations

3910

Prob > Chi-Squared
0.00
Notes: duration equation includes age, age squared, previous trips, U.S. and M exican
unemployment and line watch hours in years two and three, lagged line watch hours,
family in U.S. and agricultural worker dummy. Coefficients are listed with standard errors
in parentheses. *,** and *** denotes significant at 10, 5 and 1% level.

3910
0.00
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1. TOTAL REMITTANCES AND RATE
WITH SELECTIVITY CORRECTION

Coyote Hired

Coyote Cost

Education

Documentation

English skills

M igration Duration

Land in M exico

House in M exico

Business in M exico

Post-IRCA

LF Participation Rate - M ale

LF Participation Rate - Female

% Earning Below M inimum Wage

% Earning Twice M inimum Wage

Remittance

Total

Rate

Remittances

-418.57

-10187.11

(235.49)*

(7479.14)

0.94

24.02

(.30)***

(8.25)***

89.95

2153.14

(23.12)***

(774.10)***

-1.62

-14769.37

(.77)**

(7075.69)**

123.24

2691.75

(52.27)**

(1562.36)*

-1.62

380.47

(.77)**

(44.47)***

1169.93

22308.99

(381.27)***

(9755.26)**

256.48

-9047.16

(181.31)

(5346.21)*

-78.51

11564.69

(334.38)

(18130.37)

2213.98

61116.01

(157.97)***

(4892.92)***

1461.17

83098.91

(1463.39)

(37376.45)**

4211.62

92922.81

(1682.28)**

(42984.86)**

-1874.01

-36434.76

(787.87)**

(24343.67)

-2890.30

-79171.19

(1534.07)*

(43440.76)*

Number of Observations

4500

4500

Prob > Chi-Squared

0.00

0.00

Notes: Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *,** and *** denotes significant
at 10, 5 and 1% level.
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ENDNOTES
1

Readers interested in a description of coyote smugglers are directed to Spener (2001).
Orrenius and Zavodny (2001) find that the impact of IRCA on the number of illegal
immigrants also faded a few years after the bill‟s passage.
3
As remittances sent back to Mexico are the focus of the paper‟s empirical work, we are
not going to model the theoretical process behind savings (essentially it will be treated as
an exogenous variable). However, for theoretical completeness it is important to include
it as a factor in the budget constraint.
4
k=1 is intended to show what occurs in the model as it approaches near this point, this
end point is only a theoretical possibility.
5
The paper‟s results were robust to the inclusion of year dummies. However, we chose to
use the IRCA variable instead as it was more consistent with the literature and the theory
regarding border enforcement effects.
6
Using the output gap to measure the business cycle would have been preferred but it
was not available for Mexico for all the years in the study.
7
This is commonly known as the inverse Mills‟ ratio.
8
z contains the exogenous variables: coyote hired, coyote cost, ,education,
documentation , English skills, Saved Money in US, US Bank account, Land in Mexico,
House in Mexico, Business in Mexico, Exchange rate, Post-IRCA
x contains the exogenous variables: coyote hired, coyote cost, education, documentation,
English skills, Post-IRCA, Border Line Watch Hours, # of deportations, US
unemployment rate, Mexican unemployment rate
y contains the exogenous variables: coyote hired, coyote cost, education, documentation,
English skills, Land in Mexico, House in Mexico, Business in Mexico, Post-IRCA, LF
Participation Rate-Male, LF Participation Rate-Female, % earning below Minimum
Wage, % earning twice Minimum wage, Exchange Rate
9
This is not a universal result in the literature as some work such as Bollard et al 2009
find education to have a positive impact on remittances.
10
This may result from lower average levels of education in Mexico (scarcity), pooling
effects and/or a lack of language skills. As the average level of Mexican immigrants'
education in the United States is low, potential American employers may engage in a
pooling equilibrium in their view of Mexican immigrants lowering the return for highly
educated immigrants. Also, highly educated Mexican immigrants without proficient
English skills would be unable to get a full return from their education in Mexico. Quinn
and Rubb (2006) provide a discussion of these issues.
2
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